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Motives for Transfers from Parents to Children:  
Tests with First-Time Homeowners’ Data 
 
 
Christophe Kolodziejczyk1 and Søren Leth-Petersen2 
 
 
Abstract 
There are good theoretical reasons why transfers from parents are likely to be important around the 
time of the first home purchase. Transactions costs associated with trading houses make people with 
increasing income paths prefer to buy a house that is more expensive than what matches their current 
income. This together with a down-payment constraint make some first-time house owners borrow to 
the limit and run down liquid assets at purchase thereby making them vulnerable to adverse income 
shocks. Intergenerational transfers can alleviate these constraints. Moreover, previous papers have 
suggested that transfers from parents to children are significant exactly around the time where 
children buy their first home. Using a panel data set issued from Danish administrative registers with 
information about wealth of a sample of first-time homeowners and their parents, we document that 
child and parent resources, house value as well as financial resources are correlated. We then go on to 
test if there are direct parental transfers targeted to the purchase of the house, and in case of an 
unemployment spell during the years after the purchase where children typically hold little liquid 
assets. We also test whether children consider parental wealth as part of their own precautionary 
savings. We do not find strong evidence of any of these hypotheses. 
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1. Introduction 
There is great interest in the importance of intergenerational transfers. Transfers can for example 
alleviate adverse consequences of credit constraints, Cox (1990), and thereby influence the effect of 
public transfer policies and social insurance schemes, but transfers are also important for giving an 
adequate description of the wealth distribution, De Nardi (2004), and for understanding the 
persistence of wealth inequality. It is well established that wealth is correlated across generations, and 
we also document it in this study, but there is little evidence sorting out if this correlation exists 
because highly productive children have highly productive parents, or because children inherit the 
savings-behaviour (preference parameters) of their parents, or is it because children receive direct 
transfers from their parents? In this paper the focus is on examining the importance of direct 
transfers.  
Intergenerational transfers are potentially important in many situations. At the point of the first 
house purchase they are, however, likely to be of particular importance. Purchasing the first house is 
usually associated with a requirement to save for a down payment. Down-payment constraints work 
similarly to credit constraints to the extent that they depress consumption. Moreover, trading a house 
is associated with significant transactions costs, and this makes it optimal for most people to trade 
infrequently. People with increasing income paths, i.e. current income below permanent income, 
potentially would like to anticipate future income levels by buying a house that matches their 
permanent income rather than their current income.3 Since it is generally difficult to borrow against 
future expected earnings intergenerational transfers may overcome this constraint. The wish to 
anticipate future earnings in the face of imperfect credit markets can lead first-time house buyers to 
run down liquid assets thereby leaving limited capacity to insure themselves against (even transitory) 
adverse income shocks appearing soon after the house purchase. Ejarque and Leth-Petersen (2008) 
document that first-time house owners in Denmark mortgage to the limit and run down liquid assets 
aggressively at purchase making them particularly vulnerable to adverse income shocks appearing 
shortly after having committed to the housing expenditure. Transfers from parents to children may 
insure recent house owners against adverse income shocks.  
While there are good theoretical reasons that intergenerational transfers should play a role, also 
previous empirical studies have suggested that transfers from parents to children are significant 
around the time where children buy their first home. Engelhardt and Mayer (1998) find that for a 
                                                            
3 This is, for example, the case when agents are relatively impatient and face increasing income paths. Such agents are known 
as buffer-stock savers, Carroll (1997). 
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group of US first-time house buyers transfers significantly loosen the borrowing constraint caused by 
the down payment requirement and that transfers increase the value of the home purchased. Guiso 
and Jappelli (2002) find using Italian data that private transfers are associated with the purchase of 
larger homes. There are no previous papers focusing on the risk-sharing hypothesis in relation to first-
time house owners. However, Altonji et al. (1992) investigate if US households in the PSID exhibit 
intergenerational risk sharing. They find that parental resources do not break the link between 
variations in income and food consumption of their children thus providing evidence against 
intergenerational risk sharing. 
The objective of this paper is to examine the importance of direct financial transfers from parents to 
children around the point where the children purchase their first home. We choose to focus on the first 
house purchase because the down-payment constraint is likely to be more binding here than at 
subsequent purchases. Specifically, we ask if parental transfers influence the value of the house 
purchased or the size of the mortgage relative to the house value. We also ask if parental wealth is used 
as a buffer to cushion adverse income shocks for people that have just bought their first home. If this is 
the case then direct transfers from parents to children should be observed when the children face 
adverse income shocks. Alternatively, it should be observed that first-time house owners run down 
their liquid assets more aggressively when buying their home in the anticipation that they will receive 
transfers from their parents if adverse income shocks appear before they have restored a sufficient 
level of precautionary savings. Finally, we investigate if the share of risky assets in the portfolio of the 
children is increasing with parental wealth as should be expected if parents provide implicit insurance 
against the risk faced by their children.  
The analysis is based on a data set with panel information about wealth for a large group of Danish 
first-time house owners and their parents. Panel data are particularly valuable in this context. Lifetime 
income, the value of assets, and ownership of assets tend to be correlated across generations. This can 
both be because parents pass on wealth to their children, but it can also be because parents pass on 
inherent productivity and/or preference parameters governing savings behaviour. Indeed, Charles and 
Hurst (2003) find that these two factors are significant in explaining intergenerational correlations in 
wealth and income. Using panel data enable us to control for both parents and children fixed effects, 
and thereby to control for such confounding factors. Specifically, this is done by investigating if the 
timing and magnitude of changes in parental wealth are correlated with the timing and magnitude of 
the house purchase and savings behaviour of their children.  
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The Danish data confirm that unconditional correlations of parental resources and child resources 
are positive. However, when we introduce conditioning variables these intergenerational correlations 
weaken and disappear entirely when we condition on fixed unobserved effects. This suggests that for 
Danish first-time house owners transfer of productivity and/or preference parameters is more 
important than direct transfers. 
The analysis presented in this paper contributes to the existing literature by both considering the 
risk-sharing hypothesis and transfers for the house purchase using panel data with wealth 
information. Access to panel data with wealth information is unique and is important because it allows 
us to control for effects related to equal preference parameters and productivity across generations. 
The paper also contributes by considering the role of intergenerational transfers in a country where 
significant redistribution takes place through the tax system. In Scandinavian countries redistribution 
via the tax system is massive, particularly in Denmark, and this is likely to reduce the importance of 
intergenerational transfers. Previous studies of intergenerational transfers have considered countries 
with less developed public welfare and transfer systems. These institutional differences likely explain 
the different findings. 
The next section of the paper presents the data and simple correlations of housing and financial 
wealth across generations. As expected, levels of housing and financial variables are correlated across 
generations, but so is earnings/income and parental wealth, and it is not clear if these correlations are 
evidence of direct transfers or transfer of productivity/permanent income or preferences. Section 3 
defines a series of tests that we are going to perform in order to test if parents transfer funds for the 
house purchase and/or for supporting income when their children experience adverse income shocks. 
In section 4 the tests are implemented that will take full advantage of the panel aspect of the data to 
check if changes in financial and housing variables are correlated across generations. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. The data 
We use a panel data set constructed by merging different Danish administrative registers for 10% of 
the Danish population. The data set covers the period 1987 to 1996 and contains information at the 
individual level on demographic characteristics of the household, labour market status, housing 
tenure, income, and wealth/assets holdings. The data are obtained from the income-tax registers, and 
the wealth information exists because a wealth tax existed in Denmark in this period. The asset data 
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can be divided into a number of sub-categories: liquid assets and housing assets. Liquid assets can be 
divided into the value of bonds, stocks, cash in the bank, mortgage deeds (securities), a particular type 
of shares in ships, and a self-reported measure of high value items such as cars, and boats. Housing 
assets are based on tax-assessed values4. The liability data can be divided into mortgage debt and other 
debt up to 1993 after which we can only construct a consistent measure of total debt. These data can be 
linked to each other with the help of a personal number for individuals, which is common to all 
registers in Denmark. A nice feature of the data is that we can retrieve the same set of information for 
the partner of the main person in the sample. Moreover, and this is especially important for our 
analysis, we can also link this information with the same set of information for the parents of the 
individual and his/her partner. Because the gross data set is so comprehensive, we are able to focus on 
first-time house owners and still be left with a fairly large data set with panel data on the wealth of 
both first-time homeowners and their parents.  
The focus is on couples who are first-time owners who bought their house during the period 1989-
1993. First-time homeowners are defined as people aged between 20 and 40 who bought a house in 
this period and who were observed as renters at least two years before the house purchase. For these 
units the data set contains information on the value of the house and about income, labour-market 
status and demographic variables such as age, education and family composition. More importantly 
we have detailed information on assets and total liabilities, and we can separate assets into housing 
assets and liquid assets. Specifically, we observe the tax-assessed value of the house, and the size of the 
mortgage, but we also observe holdings of cash, stocks, bonds and securities, and high-value items 
including cars, boats, etc. All wealth variables are measured at the end of the year.   
 
Data selection 
We started out with a data set including 194,116 individuals aged between 20 and 40 who were 
observed between 1987 and 1996. From this initial data set, we have selected individuals living in 
couples during this period and who bought their first house between 1989 and 1993. We then selected 
the observations where individuals are observed with the same partner and where the couple is 
observed at least two years as renters prior to the purchase and two years as owners after the purchase. 
This left us with 5,709 couples. Finally, we left out observations with negative disposable income or 
                                                            
4 Tax-assessed house values are updated annually by the tax authorities according to the development in the market value. 
The tax-assessed value is typically slightly lower than the market value. 
6 
negative liquid assets and kept in the sample couples observed in consecutive years. The final sample 
includes 4,500 couples who are first-time homeowners with a total of 39,303 observations.   
 
The financial situation of first-time house owners  
We start out by showing a few summary statistics illustrating how households build up assets before 
the house purchase and then run them down at purchase to a fairly low level leaving them with limited 
capacity to self-insure against adverse income shocks. This reflects legal restrictions or lending policies 
imposed by banks that typically require potential homeowners to put a minimum share of the house 
price as a down payment for the purchase of their house. In Denmark legal restrictions in place during 
the period covered by our sample allow house owners to mortgage up to 80% of the house value in 
mortgage banks. Mortgage banks are specialised banks offering mortgage loans based on underlying 
mortgage bonds. Mortgage loans use the house as collateral and they are typically cheaper than 
conventional bank loans. On top of the mortgage loan households are allowed to borrow 15% of the 
house value for the purpose of buying a house in conventional banks. Also these loans are offered 
using the house as collateral, but they are typically more expensive than the loans offered by mortgage 
banks. House buyers are thus required to provide financing for the remaining 5% of the house value 
themselves. This is the effective down payment requirement. Besides this type of formal constraint 
banks can impose further restrictions on the ability to borrow for the purchase of a house. For 
example, anecdotal evidence suggests that banks often apply rule-of-thumb lending policies restricting 
the amount that can be borrowed to a multiple of the annual income of the household.  
Figure 1 plots the savings profile around the time of the house purchase for the observations in our 
sample. This savings profile is constructed from coefficients obtained from a regression of one period 
changes in liquid assets relative to the value of the house purchased on a set of dummies indicating the 
distance in time from the point where the house is purchased and a set of controls for changes in the 
number of children in the family and year dummies. Liquid assets consist of cash, bonds, stocks, 
securities and high-value items. The savings profile is scaled with the unconditional level of liquid 
assets measured in period two after the house purchase.  
 
  [Figure 1 about here; see end of paper] 
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Figure 1 shows a clear build-up of liquid assets in the periods leading up to the time of the house 
purchase. Liquid assets peak the year before purchasing the house, where average liquid assets relative 
to the value of the house to be purchased are about 3.5 percentage points higher than in the year of the 
house purchase. The households in the sample keep de-accumulating liquid assets for another period 
after the house purchase, presumably due to initial repairs. In the third year after the purchase liquid 
assets are starting to build up again, but only modestly. Not until period four after the purchase are 
liquid assets built up to a level matching the level in the year of the purchase. Table 1 presents 
summary statistics for liquid assets (henceforth denoted LA in the tables) across time where the time is 
centred at the point of the house purchase and normalised with the house value (henceforth denoted H 
in the tables) at purchase similarly to figure 1. The table shows that in period 1 and 2, where liquid 
assets are at the minimum, the mean level of liquid assets constitute some 8% of the house value 
measured at the time of the purchase. This, however, covers that the median household holds liquid 
assets corresponding to only 4% of the house value. Considering that the house value corresponds to 
roughly three times annual disposable income this means that the median household holds liquid 
assets corresponding to about 1½ months of income. This suggests that the typical first-time house 
owner has limited capacity to self-insure adverse income shocks based on the liquid asset holdings. 
Table 1 also presents summary statistics of the debt level, and for income, unemployment, and the 
share of risky assets in the portfolio. Already before the house purchase these households have 
significant debt, and in the year of the house purchase the total debt amounts to some 117% of the 
value of the house. The level of debt continues to be higher than the value of the house event seven 
years after the purchase.  
Table 1 also presents summary statistics for the development of income and for unemployment. 
Disposable income (relative to the house value at purchase) is increasing in the period leading up to 
the house purchase, but then decreases again after the purchase. The unemployment statistic presents 
the maximum unemployment duration (measured as a fraction of a year) between the two partners in 
the household. The risk of unemployment decreases after the house purchase, but the incidence is still 
significant. Finally, table 1 shows the development in the share of risky assets, measured as the 
fraction of shares in the portfolio. This measure will be used to test if the willingness to take on risk is 
related to the level of assets of the parents. Generally, the share of risky assets is low, and it is lower 
after the house purchase than before.  
 
  [Table 1 about here; see end of paper] 
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The point of departure of the empirical analysis is that wealth and house values are correlated across 
generations. On the one hand, we observe in our sample that households with expensive houses tend 
to have wealthy parents both in terms of liquid and illiquid assets (mainly the house value). On the 
other hand, we observe that wealthy parents tend to have wealthy children. In table 2 we report slope 
parameters from four regressions: (1) Children liquid assets on parental liquid assets (2) the value of 
the house purchased by the household on the level of liquid assets of the parents (3) the value of the 
house at time of purchase on the value of the parents’ house (4) children’s disposable income on 
parental liquid assets. Following Kofi & Hurst (2003) we purge for age effects, as we would like to 
control for the influence of the position in the lifecycle on wealth accumulation.  
 
  [Table 2 about here; see end of paper] 
 
In all cases these slope parameters are positive and significant. Liquid asset holdings are strongly 
correlated, house values are correlated, but the house value of the children is also correlated with the 
level of liquid assets of the parents. These correlations across generations could be the result of direct 
transfers from the parents to children where wealthy parents tend to transfer more to their children. 
They could, however, also reflect transmission of productivity/permanent income across generations. 
Wealthy parents are likely to have been productive throughout their work life and if they have children 
that are productive as well this will likely generate such correlations even if no direct financial 
transfers have taken place. In fact, parental liquid asset holdings are correlated with the income of the 
children. The two explanations are obviously not mutually exclusive. We try in the empirical part of 
this paper to design tests that can discriminate them. 
 
3. Tests of intergenerational transmission of wealth 
The main objective is to investigate if there are direct transfers from parents to children around the 
point of the first house purchase, and we focus on tests that are possible to implement with the Danish 
register data. In particular we will focus on financial transfers for two purposes. The first is transfers 
for purchasing the house. The second is for parents sustaining income of their children during spells of 
low income. We also extend the second test by investigating if children anticipate parental transfers for 
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emergencies just after they have purchased the house, i.e. if the children consider parental wealth as 
part of their buffer-stock savings. In this section we motivate and present the tests. 
 
Transferring funds for the purchase 
Engelhardt (1996) suggests that down-payment restrictions are similar to credit constraints. Although 
households have a level of life-cycle wealth which could allow them to purchase their optimal house, 
they are prevented from doing so because of these constraints. Buying and selling a house is associated 
with significant transactions costs, and this makes it optimal for most people to trade infrequently. 
People with increasing income paths, i.e. current income below permanent income, would potentially 
like to anticipate future income levels by buying a house that matches their permanent income rather 
than their current income. Since it is generally difficult to borrow against future expected earnings 
intergenerational transfers may overcome this constraint.  
In the case where parents transfer money for the purchase of the house, two effects are likely to 
occur. Recipients can either increase the value of the house that they will purchase or they can decide 
to use this transfer for the down payment thereby reducing the need for financing through (mortgage) 
banks. This suggests a test for the transfer of parental wealth for the house purchase.  
 
1. Does the value of the house purchased or the amount of house equity (price-mortgage) explain 
the development in parental wealth or liabilities at the point of the purchase?  
 
Transferring funds when adverse income shocks appear after the purchase 
First-time home buyers in Denmark face a significant down-payment constraint (figure 1 illustrated 
the effect of this), and selling the house again is associated with significant transactions costs. As 
shown by Ejarque and Leth-Petersen (2008) these two features are important for the savings 
behaviour of home buyers, and they leave a potential for parents to act as an insurance device. 
Households in the age span where they are buying their first home typically (expect to) have increasing 
incomes that they would like to anticipate. This coupled with the down-payment requirement make 
them borrow as much as they can and to run down their liquid assets when they buy the house. The 
transaction costs make housing expenditures committed, Chetty and Szeidl (2007), i.e. when adverse 
income shocks appear housing is only adjusted if the shock is large. If the shock is small then 
adjustment is made entirely on nondurable consumption, and this has large welfare costs. Ejarque and 
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Leth-Petersen (2008) show that Danish first-time house owners respond to an income shock 
appearing soon after the home purchase and decreasing income by 1% by reducing non-housing 
expenditure by 0.7%. In effect, when making the purchase decision households optimally decide to 
take on a credit constraint thereby trading away some capacity to self-insure non-housing expenditure 
event of facing small/ medium sized adverse income shocks soon after the house purchase. Cox (1990) 
finds that parents may act as an insurance device exactly when children are facing constraints. This 
type of behaviour can be rationalised by an altruism motive where parents try to smooth their 
children’s marginal utility. We denote this as the risk-sharing hypothesis.  
Children can also anticipate this motive from their parents. In that case it will affect their willing-
ness to take risks and consequently will affect their wealth accumulation and their willingness to hold 
risky assets.5 If parental wealth serves as a buffer, i.e. as a substitute for precautionary wealth, then 
people with more wealthy parents will be less risk averse, hold lower levels of liquid assets, and/or to 
hold a larger fraction of risky assets for a given level of wealth. The risk-sharing hypothesis therefore 
suggests three tests that can be implemented using the wealth data. 
2. Are changes in parental wealth correlated with the size of adverse income shocks experienced 
by the children and appearing soon after the purchase of the house?  
 
3. Is the level of precautionary savings as measured by the level of liquid assets related to the level 
of parental wealth?  
 
4. Is the share of risky assets out of total liquid assets held by the children correlated with the 
level of parental wealth?  
 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
In this section we implement the tests suggested in the previous section. 
 
Direct transfers for the purchase of the house – test 1 
For testing for the presence of direct parental transfers targeted to purchase of the house we employ 
the following regression  
                                                            
5 These two types of behaviour can also be motivated by the existence of exchange of services (Laitner, 1997). 
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     0 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 0ln lnP C C Pit t it t it t it t it tLA H X X u                   (1) 
 
Where 0
P
it tLA   is liquid asset holdings of the parents, and 0t  is the point in time where the children 
purchase the house. 0
C
it tH   is a measure of the value of the house purchased by the children at the point 
of the purchase. We also estimate versions of (1) where we include the mortgage or the amount of 
housing equity. This is to allow for the fact that a parental subsidy may be allocated to increasing 
either the value of the house or for increasing the down payment. 0
C
it tX   is a vector of control variables 
pertaining to the children. This includes number of children, age controls, number of adults, and 
indicators for educational attainment. 0
P
it tX   is a vector of parental control variables including age and 
age squared, the highest education level among the parents and two variables indicating the change in 
income from 0t -1  to 0t  and for unemployment in period 0t . We include the latter two to control for 
the saving effects of adverse shocks appearing at the parental level.  
The hypothesis of no transfers is 1 0  . We would expect that the change in parental wealth at the 
time of purchase is negatively related to the value of the house if any transfers have taken place. The 
alternative is therefore 1 0  , and rejecting against this we take it as evidence that parents have 
transferred funds for supporting the purchase of their children’s house.  
Results are presented in table 3. All variables are measured at the end of the year where the 
household have purchased their house. We estimated the models by OLS and computed a covariance 
matrix robust to the presence of unknown forms of heteroscedasticity. The dependent variable is the 
change in log parental liquid assets. Column 1 contains results for the case where 0
C
it tH   is the value of 
the house purchased by the children. Column 2 presents results from regressions where the size of the 
mortgage is added and in column 3 0
C
it tH   is replaced with the amount of equity at the point of the 
purchase. In all three cases the parameter to the variable measuring the financial need associated with 
the house purchase is insignificant suggesting that the children do not benefit from financial transfer 
from their parents when they buy their first house. As an alternative measure of transfers we have also 
tried to use the change in the level of mortgage of the parents. Parents might have a better access to 
the credit market than their children and be able to borrow money on behalf of their children (not 
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reported).  Neither in this case did we find any evidence of transfers. We conclude that direct transfers 
targeted to the children’s first home purchase are not widespread.   
 
  [Table 3 about here; see end of paper] 
 
Risk sharing: Direct transfers when income drops – test 2 
We now turn to test 2 which is a test for the presence of direct parental transfers to children when the 
children experience adverse income shocks soon after the house purchase where liquid assets are 
relatively low. For implementing test 2 we employ the following regression of the change in parental 
assets on the income shocks homeowners of our sample have incurred after the home purchase and a 
set of control variables. 
 
     0 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 0ln P C P Cit t it t it t it t it tLA y X X u                    (2) 
 
0
P
it tLA   is liquid asset holdings of the parents measured after the point in time where their child has 
bought the house.  0t  is the point in time where the children purchase the house. 0
C
it ty   is the log of 
disposable income of the children at some time t  after the house purchase. 0
P
it tX    and 0
C
it tX   are 
vectors of control variables pertaining to the parents and children respectively, and their contents 
correspond to the ones used in the previous test. If there are direct transfers from parents to children 
then we would expect 1 0  . We therefore test if 1 0   against the alternative that 1 0  . 
In practice we try different measures of adverse income shocks hitting the children. In some 
specifications we have included the change in log earnings as well as the unemployment rate and have 
tried some asymmetric responses to earnings’ shocks. We use dummy variables for whether the 
household has experienced a loss in earnings and interactions of this variable with the change in 
earnings. We have also tried to include interactions between the unemployment rates with the level of 
liquid assets over the value of the house at the time of purchase which is an indicator of the level of 
precautionary savings. The results of these regressions are reported in table 4. None of the variables 
with which we are trying to capture income shocks are significant. Since we do not find any effect of 
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children income shocks on the change in parental wealth, we conclude that there is no evidence of 
actual parental transfers when their children experience adverse income shocks. These results suggest 
that parents do not provide risk sharing to their children in such situations. This is in line with recent 
evidence by Bentolila and Ichino (2008) suggesting that family transfers constitute a less important 
insurance device during unemployment shocks in Northern European countries, where unemployment 
insurance schemes are well developed, compared to Southern European countries.  
 
  [Table 4 about here; see end of paper] 
 
Parental wealth as a determinant of the level of precautionary savings – test 3 
In our third test we test if the level of liquid assets held by the children is related to the level of 
parental wealth. One way to test this hypothesis is to take a sample of households who have just 
bought a house and relate their level of assets to parental wealth. If people use parental wealth as a 
buffer, then they will anticipate this and reduce the level of liquid assets, ceteris paribus. If this 
mechanism is at work we expect a negative correlation between the level of liquid assets and parental 
wealth. To implement the test we put up the following regression.   
 
   0 0 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 0lnC P P cit t it t it t it t it t it tLA H LA X X u               (3) 
 
The dependent variable  0 0ln Cit t it tLA H  measures the level of liquid asset holdings of the children 
after the purchase 0
C
it tLA   as a proportion of 0it tH  , the value of the house at purchase. We also attempt 
different versions where 0
C
it tLA   is normalised by the annual level of disposable income, and the size of 
the mortgage. We regress this on the log level of parental liquid assets, and a set of parental control 
variables, 0
P
it tX   , and a set of child control variables, 0
C
it tX  .  0
P
it tX    and 0
C
it tX   contain the same 
variables as in the previous tests. However, we add the change in log disposable income and the 
unemployment rate to the set of child controls as these variables are expected to directly influence 
children’s holdings of liquid assets. If children anticipate that parents will transfer funds in the case of 
emergencies then we would expect to see a negative correlation between parental wealth and the level 
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of liquid assets held by the child. We therefore test the hypothesis of no risk sharing by testing 1 0   
against 1 0  .  
The dependent variable is censored at zero, and we therefore apply a tobit estimator. We first 
estimate the parameters by applying a random effects estimator. Estimation results are reported in 
table 5, and they show that the level of liquid assets tends to be either positively related or unrelated to 
the level of parental wealth depending on the definition of the commitment applied. A positive 
correlation between parental wealth and the level of liquid assets of their children could be indicating 
that preferences and/or permanent income/productivity of children and parents are correlated, and 
that this effect dominates the effect of the children anticipating that parents would be willing to 
transfer funds in the case of an emergency situation. The first explanation is due to time constant 
unobserved factors, but the anticipation hypothesis should lead the level of precautionary savings to 
vary with the level of parental wealth. We therefore do a fixed effect censored regression, Honoré and 
Leth-Petersen (2006), to control for such fixed unobserved factors, and the results are presented in 
table 6. The results generally suggest that there is no relationship between parental liquid assets and 
the level of liquid assets held by the children, except for the case where liquid assets are normalised by 
income.  
 
  [Table 5 about here; see end of paper] 
  [Table 6 about here; see end of paper] 
 
The level of parental wealth could also influence the rate at which liquid assets are accumulated by the 
children. After the house purchase children are left with modest level of liquid assets. If parental 
wealth substitutes for precautionary wealth accumulated by the children themselves then they may 
accumulate liquid assets at a slower rate if they have wealthy parents. To investigate this we ran 
regressions where the dependent variable in equation (3) was replaced with the change in liquid assets 
(relative to the level of commitment). Results from running these regressions (not reported) indicated 
that the rate of accumulation of liquid assets after the purchase had no association with parental 
wealth. 
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Parental wealth as a determinant of share of risky assets in the portfolio–test 4 
The fourth test of the risk-sharing hypothesis tests if children are more willing to take risks if parents 
are wealthier. We do this by checking if the share of risky assets in the portfolio of the children is 
positively related to the level of parental wealth. To implement the test we run regression (4). 
  
  0 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 0lnC P P Cit t it t it t it t it ts LA X X u              (4) 
 
Where 0
C
it ts  is the share of risky assets held by the children, 0
P
it tLA  is the parent’s liquid asset holdings, 
0
P
it tX   and 0
C
it tX   are the usual set of parental and children control variables. We also include controls 
for income, unemployment, and for the level of resources held by the children, since this in itself will 
influence the share of risky assets. Finally, we include the portfolio share of the parents to control for 
the transmission of preferences between the two generations.  
The share of risky assets is a quantity between zero and one, but in practice censoring appears only 
at zero. The model is first estimated using a random effects tobit specification. Results are reported in 
table 7 where we in each column have based the regressions on different definitions of risky assets. The 
different definitions of the risky assets are explained in the appendix. Irrespective of the definition of 
risky assets results indicate that the parameter measuring the effect of parental resources on the share 
of risky assets is positive. This suggests that the more assets held by the parents the more risk is taken 
by the children, and this appears to support the risk-sharing hypothesis.   
 
  [Table 7 about here; see end of paper] 
 
To the extent that our control variables do not capture preference parameters of children and parents 
appropriately the random effects specification does not control for the confounding effect of common 
preferences across generations. A positive correlation between parental wealth and the share of risky 
assets (conditional on the level of wealth) could be indication that preferences of children and parents 
are correlated. We therefore re-estimate the equation using a fixed effects censored regression 
specification. This last specification tries to control for unobserved fixed heterogeneity and this should 
control for the confounding effects of similar preferences shared by parents and children. Results from 
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estimating fixed effects are presented in table 8. Results suggest that parental wealth is positively 
related to the share of risky assets held by the children, but the estimates are insignificant in all 
specifications. This suggests that much of the unconditional correlation is due to similarities in 
preferences between parents and children.  
 
  [Table 8 about here; see end of paper] 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have tested for the importance of direct parental transfers targeted to the purchase of 
the house and to buffer income shocks whenever households become unemployed for a sample of 
Danish first-time homeowners. The analysis is based on an extraordinary data set with panel 
information about wealth for a group of first-time house owners and their parents. Based on this data 
set we document that (housing) wealth is correlated across generations. However, when we condition 
on observed as well as fixed unobserved factors then we find no evidence that direct transfers have 
been important for Danish first-time homebuyers. We have also tried to test if the house buyers 
anticipate financial help from their parents in case they become unemployed. The results gave little 
support to this hypothesis as well. 
The results suggesting no direct transfers for the house purchase or for supporting the children 
after the purchase of the house where the children’s own buffer capacity is limited are likely related to 
institutional factors characterizing Denmark. Although there is a positive intergenerational correlation 
of wealth, credit markets are well developed in Denmark and a great deal of risk sharing is provided by 
the government through a generous unemployment insurance scheme and other transfer schemes. 
This is likely to reduce the importance of transfers across generations even for households under 
financial stress.  
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Appendix 
 
Definitions of risky assets 
We define liquid assets to include assets that can be relatively easy realised, i.e. cash, bonds, securities, 
shares and big items. In some of the tests we will perform the focus will be on the allocation of the 
portfolio into risky/non-risky assets. For this purpose we define the share of risky assets in financial 
wealth. This can be done in several ways, and we therefore choose to make three different definitions, 
cf. table A1, of risky assets and perform the test using all the definitions.  
 
Table A1: Definitions of risky assets 
Portfolio shares  I  II  III 
  Risky 
assets 
Financial 
wealth 
Risky 
assets 
Financial 
wealth 
Risky 
assets 
Financial 
wealth 
Cash    X    X    X 
Shares  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Bonds    X    X    X 
Securities  X  X  X  X  X  X 
High‐value items      X  X  X  X 
Shares in ships          X  X 
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      Table A2 Evolution of liquid assets around the time of purchase 
  (1)
  Δln(LA)/(H t=0)
  b se
5 years before purchase  0.0176** 0.0058
4 years before purchase  0.0055 0.0037
3 years before purchase  0.0092** 0.0032
2 years before purchase  0.0122*** 0.0025
1 year before purchase  0.0192*** 0.0026
Year of purchase  ‐0.0344*** 0.0031
1 year after purchase  ‐0.0074* 0.0031
2 years after purchase  0.0005 0.0032
3 years after purchase  0.0037 0.0033
4 years after purchase  0.0057 0.0037
5 years after purchase  0.0012 0.0040
6 years after purchase  0.0025 0.0045
7 years after purchase  ‐0.0012 0.0055
Child born 5 years before purchase ‐0.0469** 0.0161
Child born 4 years before purchase ‐0.0095 0.0080
Child born 3 years before purchase ‐0.0080 0.0063
Child born 2 years before purchase ‐0.0036 0.0034
Child born 1 year before purchase ‐0.0066 0.0034
Child born year of purchase ‐0.0053 0.0046
Child born 1 year before purchase 0.0012 0.0030
Child born 2 years after purchase 0.0025 0.0034
Child born 3 years after purchase ‐0.0008 0.0031
Child born 4 years after purchase 0.0029 0.0039
Child born 5 years after purchase 0.0013 0.0062
Child born 6 years after purchase ‐0.0048 0.0092
Child born 7 years after purchase ‐0.0071 0.0128
Year==1989 ‐0.0055* 0.0027
Year==1990 0.0018 0.0027
Year==1991 0.0002 0.0029
Year==1992 ‐0.0210*** 0.0030
Year==1993 0.0008 0.0032
Year==1994 ‐0.0019 0.0033
Year==1995 0.0063 0.0035
Year==1996 0.0011 0.0038
Observations  34803
        * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Tables to be inserted in the text 
 
 
Table 1: Diverse measures of financial commitments around the time of purchase 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
  t=‐5  t=‐4  t=‐3 t=‐2 t=‐1 t=0 t=1 t=2  t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7
LA t/(H t=0)  0.106  0.111  0.114 0.124 0.137 0.097 0.086 0.084  0.085 0.092 0.093 0.099 0.100
  (0.129)  (0.127)  (0.134) (0.142) (0.151) (0.116) (0.109) (0.113)  (0.117) (0.129) (0.130) (0.138) (0.134)
  [0.053]  [0.060]  [0.063] [0.072] [0.086] [0.057] [0.047] [0.044]  [0.043] [0.045] [0.045] [0.046] [0.045]
       
Disp. inc. t/(H t=0)  0.381  0.387  0.397 0.406 0.414 0.386 0.359 0.364  0.367 0.373 0.377 0.366 0.369
  (0.161)  (0.159)  (0.181) (0.182) (0.180) (0.168) (0.158) (0.161)  (0.167) (0.176) (0.172) (0.168) (0.183)
  [0.357]  [0.361]  [0.367] [0.374] [0.380] [0.352] [0.329] [0.332]  [0.333] [0.339] [0.341] [0.331] [0.324]
       
Debt t/(H t=0)  0.278  0.236  0.206 0.179 0.172 1.167 1.191 1.181  1.182 1.196 1.197 1.189 1.284
  (0.387)  (0.336)  (0.357) (0.277) (0.247) (0.601) (0.550) (0.564)  (0.579) (0.652) (0.664) (0.746) (0.955)
  [0.144]  [0.133]  [0.124] [0.120] [0.120] [1.126] [1.110] [1.106]  [1.106] [1.093] [1.083] [1.061] [1.095]
       
Unempl. rate  0.156  0.157  0.160 0.170 0.171 0.176 0.161 0.148  0.140 0.130 0.113 0.109 0.083
  (0.242)  (0.243)  (0.250) (0.258) (0.261) (0.266) (0.262) (0.252)  (0.246) (0.243) (0.225) (0.218) (0.180)
  [0.009]  [0.016]  [0.014] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
       
Portfolio share I*  0.055  0.051  0.048 0.041 0.032 0.049 0.042 0.030  0.023 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.028
  (0.173)  (0.156)  (0.145) (0.131) (0.116) (0.154) (0.148) (0.125)  (0.108) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.128)
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
       
Observations  767  1549  2741 4500 4500 4500 4500 4500  4237 3104 2205 1316 594
Note: t=0 is time of purchase. * See table A1 for definitions. 
mean,(standard‐deviation),[median]
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Table 2: Intergenerational correlation income, liquid assets and house value 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4)
  ln(LA)  ln(H)  ln(H) ln(disp.inc)
ln(LA parents)  0.168***  0.130***  0.078***
  (33.70)  (9.15)  (15.55)
ln(H parents)      0.068***
      (4.57)
Observations  39303  4500  4500 39303
Adjusted R2  0.028  0.018  0.004 0.006
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Controls for age included 
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Table 3: Are there direct parental transfers at time of purchase?  
  (1)  (2) (3)
  ∆ ln(LA parents, t0) ∆ ln(LA parents, t0) ∆ ln(LA parents, t0) 
Ln(H, t0)  0.008  0.015
  (0.15)  (0.27)
Ln(mortgage, t0)    ‐0.008
    (‐1.39)
Ln(home equity, t0)    0.002
    (0.39)
Parental control variables(i)  Yes   Yes  Yes
Child control variables(ii)  Yes  Yes Yes
Year dummies  yes  Yes Yes
Adj. R2  0.002  0.003 0.002
N  4500  4500 4500
Log‐likelihood  ‐7511.604 ‐7510.553 ‐7511.538
F  1.536  1.532 1.539
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(i) age, age2, education dummies, unemployment rate, disp. Income. 
(ii) age, age2, education dummies, number of adults, dummies for presence of children in 
different age groups. 
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Table 4: Parental transfers when unemployed   
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  ∆ ln(LA par.) ∆ ln(LA par.) ∆ ln(LA par.) ∆ ln(LA par.)  ∆ ln(LA par.) 
Unempl. rate  0.004  0.002 0.025 ‐0.003 ‐0.012 
  (0.10)  (0.07) (0.60) (‐0.08) (‐0.33) 
∆ ln(earnings)    ‐0.003 ‐0.007  
    (‐0.46) (‐0.97)  
∆ ln(earnings)*(LA/H t0)    0.039  
    (0.85)  
u*(LA/H t0)    ‐0.332  
    (‐1.01)  
LA/(H t0)  ‐0.086  ‐0.087 ‐0.050 ‐0.088 ‐0.091 
  (‐1.25)  (‐1.25) (‐0.68) (‐1.27) (‐1.32) 
1(∆earnings.<0)    0.0234 0.023 
    (1.30) (1.24) 
1(∆earnings<0)*∆ln(earnings)    ‐0.010 
    (‐1.04) 
1(∆earnings >=0)*∆(earnings)    0.010 
    (0.80) 
Parental control variables(i)  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Child control variables(ii)  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2  0.003  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
N  20456  20456 20456 20456 20456 
Log‐likelihood  ‐33060.758 ‐33060.639 ‐33059.630 ‐33059.894 ‐33058.984 
F  3.244  3.145 2.990 3.177 3.040 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(i) age, age2, education dummies, unemployment rate, disp. Income. 
(ii) age, age2, education dummies, number of adults, dummies for presence of children in different age groups.  
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Table 5: Liquid asset holdings, tobit random effects 
  (1)  (2) (3)
  LA/(H t0)  LA/(Y t0) LA/(M t0)
Ln(LA parents)  0.002***  0.005*** 0.004***
  (4.41)  (4.87) (4.94)
∆ ln(disp. inc.)  0.021***  ‐0.104*** 0.029***
  (4.22)  (‐10.42) (3.47)
Unempl. rate  ‐0.009***  ‐0.018** ‐0.010*
  (‐3.31)  (‐3.07) (‐2.21)
Parental control variables(i)  Yes  Yes Yes
Child control variables(ii)  Yes  Yes Yes
Year dummies  Yes  Yes Yes
Sigma u   
Constant  0.092***  0.178*** 0.127***
  (80.61)  (79.41) (75.59)
Sigma e   
Constant  0.075***  0.151*** 0.124***
  (176.39)  (176.27) (175.43)
Observations  20456  20456 20190
   
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(i) age, age2, education dummies, unemployment rate. 
(ii) age, age2, education dummies, number of adults, dummies for presence of 
children in different age groups. 
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Table 6 : Liquid asset holdings. Censored fixed‐effect  
Variables  LA/(H t0)  LA/(disp. inc. t0)  LA/(Mortgage t0) 
ln(LA parents)  ‐0.001  ‐0.005*  0.000 
(‐1.18)  (‐2.04)  (0.09) 
∆ ln(disp. inc.)  0.025**  ‐0.243***  0.047** 
(2.64)  (‐3.86)  (3.07) 
Unempl. rate  ‐0.006  ‐0.015  ‐0.007 
(‐1.41)  (‐1.43)  (‐0.92) 
Parental control variables(i)  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Child control variables(ii)  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  20456  20456  20190 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
(i) age, age2,  unemployment rate. 
(ii) age, age2, number of adults, dummies for presence of children in different age groups. 
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Table 7: Do homeowners with wealthy parents hold a higher proportion of risky assets (R.E.)? 
  (1)  (3) (2) 
  Portfolio share I Portfolio share II Portfolio share III 
log(LA parents)  0.033* 0.022*** 0.016** 
  (2.32) (3.76) (3.14) 
Parents' portfolio share I  0.199  
  (1.81)  
Parents' portfolio share II    0.023  
    (1.85)  
Parents' portfolio share III    0.000 
    (0.19) 
ln(LA)  0.177*** 0.382*** 0.381*** 
  (12.28) (49.83) (51.27) 
ln(disp. inc.)  ‐0.205** ‐0.221*** ‐0.210*** 
  (‐3.17) (‐7.91) (‐7.74) 
Unempl. rate  ‐0.092 ‐0.050 ‐0.043 
  (‐1.34) (‐1.62) (‐1.46) 
Lagged unempl. rate  ‐0.069 ‐0.003 0.001 
  (‐1.10) (‐0.11) (0.04) 
Parental control variables(i)  Yes  Yes Yes 
Child control variables(ii)  Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes Yes 
Sigma u     
Constant  0.580*** 0.620*** 0.610*** 
  (17.63) (44.08) (44.83) 
Sigma e     
Constant  0.321*** 0.366*** 0.364*** 
  (22.73) (68.21) (70.76) 
N  10409 19672 20400 
Log‐likelihood  ‐1291.023 ‐6018.188 ‐6262.054 
Chi2  272.761 3061.934 3225.006 
     
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(i) age, age2, education dummies. 
(ii) age, age2, education dummies, number of adults, dummies for presence of children in different age groups. 
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Table 8: Do homeowners with wealthy parents hold a higher proportion of risky assets? Censored fixed effect 
 
Variables  Portfolio I  Portfolio II  Portfolio III             
log(LA parents)  0.046  0.0173  0.013 
(0.48)  (1.58)  (1.78) 
Parents' portfolio share I  0.253   
(0.38)   
Parents' portfolio share II   ‐0.002 
(‐0.13) 
Parents' portfolio share III    0.001 
  (0.67) 
ln(LA)  0.236***  0.417***  0.413*** 
(4.09)  (25.39)  (26.75) 
ln(disp. Inc.)  ‐0.344  ‐0.253  ‐0.221 
(‐2.44)  (‐3.67)  (‐3.35) 
Unempl. rate  0.070  ‐0.001  ‐0.003 
(0.33)  (‐0.03)  (‐0.08) 
Lagged unempl. rate  ‐0.035  0.003  0.003 
(‐0.24)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
Parental control variables(i)  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Child control variables(ii)  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  10409  19672  20400 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <0.001 
(i) age, age2,  unemployment rate. 
(ii) age, age2, number of adults, dummies for presence of children in different age groups. 
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  Figure 1: Liquid asset holdings at different points in time relative to home purchase 
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  Note: This graph is based on parameters of regression presented in table A2. 
 
                           
